In this article, we investigate the effect of environmental policy on economic growth using an R&D-based growth model with endogenous labour supply. A government implements a pollution permit as environmental policy. As a result, we conduct a numerical analysis and find that a decrease in pollution permit levels positively effects economic growth.
Recently, environmental pollution has significantly affected economic activities worldwide.
The economic cost of air pollution such as the cost of particulate matter (PM) has been extensively reported by the OECD (2014). Air pollution in China is particularly serious.
Serious air pollution such as PM-10 forces China to abstain from outdoor economic activities and diminishes labour productivity because of sickness caused by air pollution.
1
When discussing a relation between environment policy and economic growth in an endogenous growth model, researchers often discuss the growth effect from environmental policies. 2 For example, Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) find that an environmental tax has a positive growth effect by considering the positive externality of environmental quality. By using the variety expansion model of Romer (1990) , Grimaud (1999) shows that a decrease in pollution permit levels has a negative growth effect. In contrast, Ono (2002) shows that a decrease in pollution permit levels has a negative growth effect. Considering the creative destruction model of Aghion and Howitt (1992) , Nakada (2004) finds that an environmental tax has a positive growth effect. Although we do not reach any consistent conclusion, the previous works show that a decrease in pollution permit levels has a growth-degenerating effect.
Researchers argue that an endogenous labour supply clarifies the growth-enhancing effect of an environmental policy. Hettich (1998) shows that an environmental tax has a growthenhancing effect in a Uzawa-Lucas model with endogenous labour supply. This is because leisure time that is decreased by an environmental tax increases study time and boosts economic growth. Using a learning by doing model, Itaya (2008) shows that the growthenhancing effect from an environmental tax exists when an indeterminacy of equilibrium occurs. Although the author shows that a labour supply increase from an environmental policy stimulates growth rates, no study analyzes the growth effect from a reduction in pollution permit levels in an R&D model. This paper attempts such an analysis.
The model in this study is based on the variety expansion model by Romer (1990) . We consider a pollution permit an environmental policy. We conduct a numerical analysis and find that a decrease in the pollution permit levels can have a positive effect on economic growth. Additionally, we present a numerical example where the environmental policy has a positive effect on welfare.
The present paper is composed of the following sections. Section 2 shows the dynamic general equilibrium model. We investigate the stability of the dynamic system in Section 3.
Section 4 depicts an effect of environmental policy on economic growth and welfare. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The model
We consider an economy that consists of a representative household, a final good sector, 
Final good sector
Following Gradus and Smulders (1993), we assume that net pollution flow is produced by the following mechanism:
where To internalize the negative environmental externalities, the government implements an environmental policy of pollution permits. We explain the market for the pollution permit.
The government distributes quotas for permits to the firms (P ) in each period. The firms freely trade the distributed quotas in the competitive pollution permit market. The unit price of the pollution permit is denoted by p e t . The firms that emit pollution in excess of the pollution permit (P t >P ) using the intermediate good must purchase the pollution permit of (P t −P > 0) in the market at the price p e t . On the other hand, the firms that emit pollution under the pollution permit (P t <P ) by employing the abatement good can sell the pollution permit of (P − P t > 0) in the market at the price p e t . The pollution permit market must be cleared.
The final good is produced by the following production function:
where Y t is the output of final goods. We employ the final good as the numeraire good. L Y,t is labour input. The final good firms choose their inputs, taking the factor prices as given.
Thus, the final good firms maximize the following:
where w t is a wage rate in the final good sector, p j,t is the price of the intermediate good j, p e t is the price of the pollution permit, andP is the permit quotas given to a firm in each period. The first order conditions of profit maximization are given by:
where (3), (4) and (5) state that the firms hire labour, the intermediate goods i and the abatement good until their marginal products are equal to their factor prices.
Intermediate good sector
Each intermediate good firm is a monopoly firm. The firms buy designs from the R&D sector by paying the fixed-cost investment and maximize their profits by taking the inverse demand function for their intermediate good as given. The variable costs are the interest costs. Thus, the firms maximize the following:
The first order conditions of profit maximization are given by
The quantity of the intermediate good x is determined by substituting the price into the inverse demand function for the intermediate good j. Therefore, the prices and the output level of all intermediate goods firms become the same.
R&D sector
A new variety of intermediate good is developed by the following technology:
where A t is the stock of the variety's intermediate good, L A,t is labour input and δ > 0 is a parameter of productivity. P At is the price of a new design. A perfect competition prevails in the R&D sector. Thus, free entry into the R&D sector results in the following:
Household
The representative household maximizes the following:
where C t is consumption, l t is leisure time, 0 < β < 1 represents the weight on the utility attached to consumption and leisure , η p > 0 shows the weight on the utility attached to pollution, and ρ > 0 is a subjective rate of time preference.
The budget constraint isẆ
where W t is a financial asset held by the household. The time constraint is
The household maximizes (10) by choosing a consumption stream and an allocation of time between leisure and labor supply. The first order conditions become
where λ t is the shadow price of assets, and (16) is the transversality condition. Substituting (13) into (14), we obtain the following:
where (17) states that a marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is equal to the wage rate. From (13) and (15), we obtain the following Euler equation:
Market
The economy is composed of the pollution permit market, the labour market, the capital market, the stock market and the good markets. In equilibrium, the pollution emitted by the final good firms coincides with the pollution permits distributed by the government(P t =P ).
The labour market is cleared(1 = L Y,t +L A,t +l t ). Because each intermediate good firm holding the patent rents capital from households, we obtain the following equilibrium condition for the capital market:
The no-arbitrage equation is the following:
Finally, in the good market, the following holds:
3 Equilibrium
Dynamic system
By defining two jump variables (
we obtain the following dynamic system:
Appendix A shows their derivations.
Steady state
The steady state is determined byẏ t =ω t =ż t = 0. Then, we obtain the following steady state:
We show the derivation of steady state in Appendix B. In the steady state, the leisure time and the labour times spent in the final good sector and in the R&D sector become
We show their derivations in Appendix B. In a steady state, the growth rate becomes
Appendix B shows the derivation of growth rate.
Stability
By linearizing the dynamic system around the steady state (y * , ω * , z * ), we obtain the following linearized system:
where J 21 and J 22 are
We apply the Routh-Hurwitz theorem:
Theorem 1 (Routh-Hurwitz Theorem)

The number of roots with positive real parts involved in the characteristic equation is equal
to the number of variations in the sign of the scheme:
To check the stability, we obtain the following signs of trJ and detJ:
trJ > 0 and detJ < 0.
We show their derivations in Appendix C. Because trJ > 0 and detJ < 0 hold, the eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix have one stable root and two unstable roots. Hence, the steady state is locally saddle-point stable.
Comparative statics
In this section, we numerically investigate how changes in the pollution permit levels affect the growth rate and welfare. Figure 4 and Figure 6 reveal that decreases inP have a positive effect on y * , z * , L Y * , and L A * . Figure 3 and Figure   5 reveal that decreases inP have a negative effect on ω * and l * . Thus, Figure 7 shows that decreases inP have a positive effect on the growth rate.
The effect of environmental policy on the growth rate
[Inserted Figure. (7)). This increases the dividend per stock and the demand for a new design. The demand for labour from the R&D sector also increases along with the sector wage rates. Hence, the households supply labour to the firms in the R&D sector. Finally, the decreases inP stimulate R&D activity and boost the growth rate.
The effect of environmental policy on welfare
We investigate numerically the effects of a decrease in pollution permit levels on the welfare level of the steady state. Our welfare measure is (10) . By substituting C t = z * (P )K 0 e gt and (25) in (10), we rewrite (10) as follows:
The terms from first to third show the indirect effect of a decrease inP on the welfare level through consumption, the growth rate, and leisure. The fourth term shows the direct effect of a decrease inP on the welfare level. By following De Hek (1999) and Ouealati (2002), we show the welfare effect using the following parameters: α = 0.25, β = 0.8, ρ = 0.01, δ = 0.5, η P = 0.140974. We assume K 0 = A 0 = t = 10. The result is presented in Figure 8 . We considered the effect of an environmental policy on economic growth in an R&D-based growth model with endogenous labour supply. Then, we analyzed how a reduction pollution permit levels affects the growth rate and welfare. As the result of analysis, we conduct a numerical analysis and find that a decrease pollution permit levels has a positive effect on the economic growth rate. Moreover, we presented a numerical example where environmental policy has a positive effect on welfare.
Appendix
A The derivation of the dynamic system
Using (1) and P t =P , we rewrite (5) as the following:
Using (A. 1), we rewrite (4) as the following equation:
Substituting (A. 2) into (6), we obtain the following:
We rewrite (3) as the following:
Substituting (A. 5) into (9), we obtain the following:
We rewrite
1−α as the following:
Substituting (A. 7) into (A. 6), we obtain the following:
Substituting (A. 3) and (A. 4) to (20), we obtain the following:
Substituting (A. 8) into (A. 10), we obtain the following:
Using the time derivative of (A. 8), the following holds:
We obtain (22) by substituting (A. 11) into (A. 12).
Using (1) and P t =P , we rewrite (21) as the following:
Substituting (9) into (17), we obtain the following:
Using (12), (A. 7) and (A. 14), we rewrite (8) as the following:
Substituting (A. 3) into (18), we obtain the following:
We obtain (24) using (A. 13) and (A. 16).
B The derivation of steady state and growth rate
The steady-state is determined byẏ t =ω t =ż t = 0. Using (22), we obtain ω * (P ). Using (24),
we also obtain z * (P ). By substituting ω * (P ) and z * (P ) into (23), we obtain the following equation:
(A. 17) is a quadratic equation of y * (P ). By solving (A. 17), we obtain a positive solution(y * (P ) > 0) and a negative solution(y * (P ) < 0). We choose the positive solution(y * (P ) > 0) as the solution of (A. 17). Then, we obtain the following solution: 
Using (A. 3) and z * , we rewrite (A. 20) as the following:
We rewrite (A. 3) as the following equation:
By substituting this equation into (A. 21), we obtain the following:
Then, we obtain trJ > 0. 
